A Promise (A poem)

He asks me: “Where
is the poem you promised
to write long ago?”

I am at a loss what
to tell him: that I lost it
somewhere along the way,

or, that it never came to me
the way I wanted it to come.
Or, shall I say, it never stayed

with me long enough to grow
and flow into my dreamy senses,
the cocoon of my soul?

Or, shall I tell him it died long ago
in the whirlpool of my heart,
was consumed by the gaze

of the winter moon.
Or, that it trembled, fainted
until I lost words to the hollow

winter nights when young lifeless
bodies sobbed with the Jhelum?
But wait!

Sometimes it sprung inside me
unexpectedly
like a memory

of my beloved’s treachery
wrangling through
tumultuous summer nights.

I assure you, my friend, I kept
writing it all these years on the stout
walls of our city streets,

in the wails of our young men
in their tenacious heartbeats
in the fury of flying stones

in the fierce sweep of falcons
in the enraged eyes of summer moons
in the sky of my solitude

in the dome of our sky
in its cold, demurring stars
in yamberzals and lilacs,

in simmering spring songs
in the stillness of the morning
in the orange of the falling day

in the spring of abandoned smiles
in all the space between you and I.
And still you ask: “Where
is the poem you promised?”
I assure you, my friend,
it grows on the slate of my memory,

word by word it grows everyday
moist as Mughli’s eyes
absorb the silence of her black shawl.

It grows cold as the earth
of unmarked graves, hangs
as a clock of a broken time

I kept weaving it
moment by moment,
on petals of a narcissus

on the path that leads
to the shrine of our dream
of a new dawn

So, my friend, I kept it with me
as much as it kept me.
Here, I pass it on to you

in the very act of writing it,
the poem we both are writing
every day, every night,

a poem of our people
a poem by our people
a poem for our people

 

First published in Kashmirlit.org (Winter 2014)

http://www.kashmirlit.org/a-promise/

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Tale of A Young Man When He Kept Long Hair for The First Time

If I remember it clearly it was the summer of 2006, I was a young man in my early twenties, and I had just returned home after some nine months being away. In 2005 I had entered famous north Indian institute (and perhaps safest refuge of Kashmiris in India) Aligarh Muslim University (AMU).

Living away from my family and my homeland Kashmir for the first time was not so hard, for in AMU three of my cousins had established themselves there like Dandelion roots in soil, providing the much needed sense of security and support. I was emotionally insured.

As an entrant to the world of literature my susceptibility to new ideas – radical and conservative – was high. I was, I can say with the benefit of hindsight, somewhere in the middle path.

But still within this latent moderated domain some radical thoughts would make momentary forays only to be shooed away by the invisible scarecrows of the university. You can call it orthodox culture or maybe it was just my perception drawn from university’s arched Baroque buildings. Whatever it was, this orthodoxy endeared it to me.

In November 2005, following the bidding of my mother, my younger cousin Nimmy Bhaya asked me to get atop a rickety Rickshaw. “We are going to a barber” he informed me on the way. The wiry rickshaw man was pulling the carrier with great effort, thick veins of his bare legs propping out under the sweaty shine.

The hair cut was my last one; but within four or five months I could see my black hair forming soft curls on my forehead. I felt delighted. It had been my teenage wish to grow long hair and push them back by running my fingers through. I suspect, in my teens, I had seen Afridi doing it before starting run-up to bowl his fast paced leg spinners. Good God! Eight years have passed Afridi has stayed same with the same hair, while I can feel my receding hairline now!

In the evening I would put on unorthodox khadi kurta over blue jeans, take a stroll in my sprawling hall of residence called MM Hall, take measured steps and pay respect to my seniors, “Salam u alykum Bhai”.

“Kya haal hai, sahi lag rahe ho, bhai” (How are you, dude, looking cool in that), compliments would be showered by my batch mates and elders alike. I had reason to feel good and I had good reason to keep the long hair.

Any thoughts that I would entertain before in favor of a haircut were now eschewed. There was no need to shy away from my freedom. I owned it to nobody.

In the sultry and excruciatingly distressing weather of north India, I took care of my burgeoning hairdo on my head – oiled, curly, and shoulder length. It irritated sometimes when it created that itchy feeling around the sweaty neck in the heat of the summer. But I endured it without complaining.

Looking at my long hair and audacious knack for putting on weird clothes, someone told me that I was bringing JNU culture here. I agreed. I said “we should”.

JNU was another north Indian university but it shared nothing like north in its outlook. Located in Delhi, the capital of India, it was imagined in AMU as a Disneyland of unorthodox nerds, whose societal (and sometimes cognitive) dislocation came from the entrenched Marxist tradition – the warp and woof of their ideological superstructure.  I viewed them favorably. Because before ending up in AMU, I had tried to get into that Disneyland of nerds but, as my good luck was shining on me in unwavering intensity, I ended up in the class of Prof. Rahatullah, who would be too busy with his acute sinusitis to tell us what really moved T.S Eliot to write the Wasteland. Mind you, Prof. Rahatullah was no no-sense professor, but only he was generous enough to finish his class before official bum-paining 55 minutes. He was really not a Wasteland stuff.

In my outlook I was still on the middle path, clinging on to the traditional values and yet at the same time exploring (or attempting) new and fresh idea and paths.

In the summer of 2006 I returned home. Fresh cool air of Kashmir would bring even a dead rooster to life, says an Old Persian proverb. I was just in my early twenties, this proverb made a lot of sense to me post my experience of the sweltering heat of the north Indian plains.  On one Friday after finishing prayers in open air I had to run quickly to the water cooler to save my arms from turning into a flat half-meter igneous rock.

Well, back in Kashmir during the first few days of my first summer holiday at home my family did not mind my new avatar. But gradually, this initial magnanimity gave way to volleys of soft taunts “mast kall”, “Junglee”, “Mast Gul” “Danny” (roughly all these meant weird guy). But I presented an epic resistance to this emotional coercion; I stayed the course. As my maternal throw his weight behind me I was emboldened. “You look better this way, you dude”, my uncle said.

With my friends I would take a daily dose of wanderings around my town, spending a good deal of time in quintessentially giggling Namblabal (our town has some six neighborhoods that have “Bals” in their names like my own neighborhood is called Kadalbal).  Every late afternoon, me and my friends would stroll around the markets of Namblabal and return home late to the harmless admonishes of the family.

Everything was going fine till that one particular day (I don’t remember exactly the position of the sun) somebody grabbed my wrist in the busy market. As I turned I was taken aback to see it was an army guy. But what helped regain my posture which had reflexively assumed a default position of surrender, was his small height and boyish countenance.  “Kahan se hay?” (Where are you from?)his tone was not that threating. His complexion was fair with fresh whiskers sprouting around his mouth. He was with a gaggle of soldiers wearing khaki fatigues and holding assault rifles. His colleagues gave a mean smile like those subway vagabonds stalking a lone girl.

“Kadalbal se”, I replied.

“Yahan kya kar raha hay?” (What are you doing around here?”

“Bus kaam tha yahan” (Had a work here)

“Ye lambe baal kyun rakhe hain? Hero hai kya!” (Why have you kept this long hair? You acting a hero here!)

Before I could reply, he pulled me, “Chal naiyee ke pass” (Come I take you to the barber)

Incidentally the barber shop was right there few meters away from us, I thought he was serious and would really take me there. I imagined a north Indian barber with a scissor and my lowered head coming out through a meek body wrapped in a silken covering. I was reluctant to follow, but there was no way to say no to him.

I must have looked silly when I sputtered out, “Me bahar tha, me bahar tha” (I was out of town) as if he would have behaved less strictly, as if he was a school principle and I was a naughty student presenting a lame excuse at the sight of a scale.

Perhaps he was not aware that there was a barber shop, perhaps he knew and just wanted to scare me – a new guy in the town for him.

He let me go with a warning, “Ye baal kal nahi dikhne chahiye” (by tomorrow you must have cut your hair).

They were from the local army camp and there are very few Kashmiris who can do otherwise.

After eight years when I recall that moment I ask many questions to myself. I know for many Kashmiris this would be obvious, but still i think over it, like what made them behave like they did. Was it just for fun or a serious warning?  I know Indian soldiers can and do exert their authority over us like this and like many other ways, but still what makes them take away those freedoms of young Kashmiris which barely harm their national security? Does it say anything about their sense of entitlement over our personal freedoms? Does it say anything about the kind of militarized rule Kashmiris are forced to live in?

Perhaps I should have realized that Kashmir was not AMU, nor was it north India, nor even India. Kashmir was Kashmir.

When I went back to north India, I must have looked around and found many young Indian guys sporting long hair and I must have asked myself how many of these guys have brothers in Indian army serving in Kashmir?

 

On Nayeema Mehjoor’s Deceptive Talk

On January 10 when BBC Urdu’s broadcaster Nayeema Mehjoor joined the People’s Democratic Party, the party patron Mufti Syed welcomed her with these words: “I invite intellectuals, professionals and educated people to join us. The People’s Democratic Party offers a respectable space for such people who want to contribute in changing the political narrative of Jammu and Kashmir” (Greater Kashmir, 2014). The party president Mehbooba Mufti outlined the mandate that PDP had accorded Nayeema: “Kashmir Resolution and Governance”.

Now given the checkered history of Kashmir and abiding expectations of its people, this mandate simply is grandiose, and Nayeema must be talented enough to earn herself this job. Seems Kashmir has its own Richard Holbrooke now!

However, while Nayeema’s induction into PDP was hailed by benefactors of pro-India constituency, her decision had made supporters of resistance movement react with utter surprise. The Kashmiri social media momentarily buzzed with the issue. Because, she had been writing regularly on Kashmir with apparent non-partisan and pro-people position, the pro-resistance readers of her columns had come to recognize her as one of their own. But the news of her joining PDP demolished the fine line of ambiguity that she had drawn on their perception of her political leanings.

Sensing that her decisions had not gone well with pro-resistance people she immediately came up with a clarification, affirming she will never contest any elections. However, at the same time she argued “we have to be within the system to change the system” (Vox Kashmir, 2014).

“Why would the world accept our view point when we can’t even stand united” she asked rhetorically.

Perhaps as a corollary to her prodigious mandate, Nayeema wrote an opinion piece “What to Expect from Modi” in Greater Kashmir (March 14, 2014). I would briefly summarize her points:

Modi is certain to win because of favorable media coverage and “blessings of the outside world”

If BJP comes to power it should carry forward “Mission Kashmir” of A.B. Vajpayee, the erstwhile BJP leader and PM of India. Vajpayee had promised “sky” in a Srinagar Rally and his policy was “to win the hearts and minds of people by resolving the Kashmir dispute”

BJP is seen by people in Kashmir as the genuine broker of peace and they believe that only BJP can resolve the Kashmir conflict.

“People still believe that if Modi comes in power, he will work hard to place the Art.370 in its original shape”

Well, apart from the article’s PRish tinge, it presents some rather naïve arguments that are bereft of any substantial evidence.

Modi’s rise is more an assertion and acceptance of Hindutva ideology in Indian body politic. The pro-Modi mood is not merely media-generated hype it is the reflection of larger ideological projection striking primal chords among the majority community in India. From late 1980’s the vote share of right wing Hindutva parties has been growing exponentially. From 1991 elections onwards BJP has continued to garner over 20% of total vote share in Indian parliamentary elections. Come 2014, you may see further rise. It has been elected in as many as eight states in India. In a “secular democracy” extreme right wing is voted to power regularly, it certainly says something. Ironically, right wing parties in Islamic Republic of Pakistan, often denounced for “religious extremism”, remain a marginal force garnering not more than 2% vote share in national elections.

The second point that Vajpayee was a messiah of peace and wanted to free Kashmiri people from agony and suppression is a credulous assumption.

In the Liberhan Commission report Vajpayee features among 68 people who were responsible for the demolition of the historic Babri Masjid in December 1992. In the vitriolic speech (available on internet) he incited the karsevaks (volunteers) to demolish the mosque. After Babri Masjid demolition around 3000 riots broke out in 16 states in India; in Maharashtra alone 900 people were killed, most of them Muslims (K. Pokharel and P. Beckett; Wall Street Journal, Dec 2012). Years later Vajpayee would still say Ram Mandir is “expression of national sentiment… still to be realized”. As the Liberhan report rightly says Vajpayee was a “pseudo-moderate”.

BJP was in power from 1998-2004 and in Kashmir it not only continued the repressive policies of the previous governments but also introduced new black laws like Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). A carpet weaver from Srinagar, Ghulam Mohammad Dar, became its first victim in November 2001. Dar was arrested and kept in jail for 18 months while his aged mother and wife along with two sons thrown out of their house. Over 100 Kashmiris were charged under this draconian law, including political activist Anjum Zamaruda Habib.

In February 2002 Gujrat riots, around 2000 Muslims were brutally killed (C. Jaffrelot, 2003). Vajpayee as a Prime Minister of India did not prevent the riots and rather wickedly said, “Wherever there are Muslims in large numbers, they do not want to live in peace.”

Chattisinghpora Massacre, Pathribal fake encounter, Barakhpora killings, “collective conscience” verdict on Afzal Guru, these are the legacies of the same period.

It was the same BJP who pressed for appointment of Jagmohan as governor of Kashmir in 1990. Jagmohan’s anti-Muslim policies are well known even to some Indian people. In Kashmir, he encouraged repressive tactics to terrorize the Kashmiri people.

Moreover, I would like to ask, If Vajpayee, as a Prime Minister of India (at the apex of “the system” I would assume) failed to move anything beyond martial hands of Pervez Musharraf and a bus ride to Lahore what makes you feel you can pull off a resolution? Wasn’t the same BJP (you seem to admire as a genuine peace broker) responsible for scuttling the Agra Summit in July 2001?

Lastly, as Geelani sahab says, “Azmaye hovay ko kya aazmana”, policies of all the Indian political parties are informed by majoritarian and imperial attitudes and prejudices. While you are naively expecting miracles and glad tidings, BJP and the larger Hindutva brigade (of all colors in rightwing, leftwing and liberal elite) are planning more sinister policies.

The “system” you audaciously say you seek to reform is actually called nation-state, a construct of so formidable and violent nature, that those who get drawn too close to it not only get sucked into it but their remaining moral and ethical fragments are squeezed out from their souls.

Late Kashmiri poet Mehjoor (who ironically happens to be Nayeema’s father-in-law also) expresses it like this: “There’s restlessness in every heart, /But no one dare speak out -/Afraid that with their free expression/Freedom may be annoyed.”

First published in Greater Kashmir (March 21, 2014)
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/21/finally-into-the-mainstream–11.asp

Tale of a Political Fugitive

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If latest reports are to be believed, then it is no surprise to inform you that Jersey-cow-turned-political-fugitive Victor Yanukovich has been seen drinking Russian Vodka in a palatial Dacha (Villa) of Big Brother Putin somewhere on Black Sea coast. Intriguing indeed!
Chuvak (Russian for ‘dude’) is a term seldom employed by Big Brother Putin in his informal conversations, as it is reserved for his rarest of rare buddies, like that showpiece of Russian politics Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Mr. Zhirinovsky is famous for publicly, which is his default setting any ways, showering generous praises on American leaders, especially Condoleezza Rice. Once he even threatened President Bush by saying that Russia can alter the gravitational field of the planet to sink America. Now without vodka shot that is a big thing to imagine! Elsewhere he offered free vodka for men and better underwear for women in his prime ministerial race. Anyways, whenever Big Brother Putin feels bored of his burgeoning Gay fans or high adrenaline Caucasian games he often invites him to his Dacha to showcase his multiple talents, chief among them being riding a polar bear with dude Zhirinovsky as a pillion.
“Chuvak, hold on tight, else you will break your stupid Polish bum!” Big Brother has to repeat on every ride with vodka-mouthed Mr. Zhirinovsky.
Now let me come back to poor Yanukovich here. When he mysteriously arrived on Putin’s Dacha, Big Brother literally sprung up on his sofa on seeing him.
“What the heck are you doing here! Fella!” Putin’s eyes had opened wide in surprise. Momentarily he floated in air over his leather couch.
Poor Yanukovich was gasping for breath, he looked dejected, and protruding his mouth he cried “Kashmar, Kashmar (disaster), Cooo….cooo, Bolshoy brat, cooo!”
“What cooo…cooo!, what happened to you!”
“They tried to cooo me, Bolshoy brat, Kashmar, kashmar, cooo”
“Who the hell is this cooo? Filthy poking CIA, M15! Who? Would you tell me?” Putin looked with enquiring eyes at two KGB guys standing nearby.
Unsure, they looked at each other. Nodding their sunglasses mounted heads sideways, they shrugged and stood still.
“That boxer, that famous Gorilla, Bolshoy brat”
“Ah! Ha! That Goliath of a guy, what is his damn name….yes, yes I got it….Vitali Kalashnikov, right!”
“Klitschko, Sir” the nearby KGB guys corrected him.
“Yes whatever, Kalashnikov or Klitschko, it doesn’t matter. Even the name of his party is violent, what is it called?”
“Udar, Sir”. KGB guys informed.
Yanukovich now recounted his story to the Big Brother. He told him that he had called KGB to get him out of the mess and they smuggled him out of Kiev in a Soviet era four-wheeler called Zaporozhets or ZAZ 965. (Better half of India’s Ambassador Car)
KGB told the President that Zaporozhets was used because no one could suspect it for any clandestine use and besides only in Zaporozhets’ spacious trunk could portly Yanukovich fit in.
After Yanukovich made his Bolshoy brat (big brother) understand the reasons of his escape, the President decided to impart some Judo skills to him to make him ready for a comeback to his country.
“Look Chuvak, if you want to fight that Gorilla, learn how to hit him in the right place, ok”
“Got it, Bolshoy brat”
“Apart from Judo I will teach you how to tame a polar bear, you got to tame lot of Gorillas out there, right, Chuvak?”
“Got it, Bolshoy brat”
“And you got to be fit. You will be served special Lincolnshire beef cooked on special Gazprom fuel for four times a day and Lincolnshire sausage and Lincolnshire beer and Lincolnshire milkshake also prepared with Gazprom fuel”
Yanukovich was baffled. “I have taste of Gazprom but why everything Lincolnshire, Bolshoy brat!”
“That is the problem with you, eastern guys. Our efficient scientists – our own Russian scientists – already proved that Lincolnshire food stimulates geostrategic thinking. Remember that old British guy Mackinder he was born there, wasn’t he?”
“And this time when you get hold of that old blond, what is her name, ah Yulia Tymoshenko, send her to our Siberian jail. I am sure frozen Olympian braid will look much prettier on her”
“Sure, Bolshoy brat”
“And besides, get rid of those smartphones immediately, you cannot trust poking nose of Washington nincompoops. And always keep a watch on Kerry’s Brussels honeymoon, got it!”
“Bolshoy brat, you are a genius!” Though, Putinian metaphors seemed to him tad heavy to grasp.
But Yanukovcih was convinced and now according to sources, he has already started to follow Big Brother’s dietary prescription called Heartland Diet. He is yet to learn the bear taming techniques but he regularly takes Judo lessons to have a smack down with the Gorilla Klitschko. Reportedly, he will begin his encounter in favorable Crimea ring first.

Published in Greater Kashmir (March 1, 2014)

http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/1/tale-of-a-political-fugitive-6.asp

I Will Not Forget You

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I will not forget you in my prayers, brother

Nor shall I forget ever your mother, the way

She carried her wounded heart on her worn black stole

and beseeched the heavens not to fall today.

That wound shall remain and may not let heal her soul

Till that dawn of dawns ushers in, bringing glad tidings

Of her dear one and takes the ache away.

 

I will not forget that dawn in my prayers

The dawn that is a dream held in tears,

For which I have pledged to bow my head

Before a tapering minaret that wears

an ancient look and seems to hold up

the heavens, ever cloudy and red.

 

I will not forget your sisters in my prayers

Who weaved a piercing melancholy in layers

The henna faded on their hands

While you vanished to distant timeless lands

And the song at your funeral in their heart

shaheedo shaheedo treish ma lajyio

Yiman khoon zakhman ye beniiha lagyio (1)

 

I will not ever, ever forget you in my prayers

Not your parched lips, your blood and tears

That call for your mother, too far to hear.

Only she was holding her anxious heart at the doorway,

To fold you forever in her calm embrace.

No one told her that your clothes were drenched in blood.

All they told her was: he cried, “Muajay, Muajay … katti chhakh Muajay” (2)

And a faint smile clung tenaciously to his face.

 
Glossary:
(1) O martyr, my martyr are you thirsty
Your sister feels the pain of your wounds
(2) O mother, O mother… where are you O mother

First published in Reading Hour magazine (Jan-Feb. 2012 Issue)

Idea of a Nation

“What I propose to do today” so begins Ernest Renan in his 1882 lecture at Sorbonne, “is to analyze with you an idea which, though seemingly clear, lends itself to the most dangerous misunderstandings.” This idea of nation or nationalism to which Renan emphatically reminded his audience of ‘dangerous misunderstandings’, continues to be a hard topic for assessment and explanation. People have this general tendency to take the nation-state as something evolutionary political formation, and regard empires ‘as anomalies’. However, when we look at the general history it becomes quite clear that people have largely lived in empires, “with the nation-state the exception rather than the rule”. So what really triggered this certain shift from large empires (Hapsburg, Romanov, Ottoman etc.) to new entities now called as nation-states (France, Germany etc.)? And what factors influenced the course of their formation?
The debate on the idea of nation or nationalism has meandered through different intellectual spheres, from Giambatista Vico’s subjectivisation of the nations (Vico saw nation as a part of human history as opposed to the divine history) to the German Romantic notions as expressed by Herder ( his concept of Volk culture was the earliest accentuation of ethnic national identity ) or Meinecke ( who borrowed from Herder and gave a new concept of Kulturnation – “an extended family with one national characteristic”); From Fichte’s concept of a “natural law of divine development” or Hegel, Burke and Maistre’s emphasis on religiously and communally based norms – what Hegel called Sittlichkeit – as an essential element of national identity to the modernist concept of the “imagined communities”, the idea persists with its profound complexities and continues to be a subject of immense intellectual debate.
To answer our question we have to look at the factors that were responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon of nationalism, which according to sociologist Ernest Gellner “invents nations where they do not exist” (1964:168). Arguing under the modernist framework Gellner emphasizes on the ‘invented-ness’ of a nation which was possible by the imposition of a ‘common high culture’ on a number of different local folk cultures. This ‘invented-ness’ of the nation is thoroughly dealt with by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work Imagined Communities. For Anderson the rise of the ‘print-capitalism’, at the dawn of the 17th century, made possible for ‘rapidly growing number of people to think about themselves, and relate to others, in profoundly new ways’. The great communities of the past (Christendom, Islamic Ummah or Middle Kingdom), according to Anderson, imagined themselves ‘largely through the medium of sacred language and written script’. These communities ‘conceived of themselves as cosmically, through the medium of sacred language, linked to a super terrestrial order of power’. However, with the advent of the modern ‘print capitalism’ there occurred a rapid vernacularization of languages which, consequently, were elevated to ‘the status of languages-of-power’ and became a sort of competitors with Latin, and thus became a deciding factor for the decline of this sacred language – Latin – and ultimately ‘fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized’ the sacred communities. Moreover, their ‘unselfconscious coherence’ diminished gradually with the exploration of the non-European world. This discovery ‘abruptly widened the cultural and geographical horizon and hence also men’s conception of possible forms of human life.’ For Gellner, nationalism was instigated by industrialization – a determining feature of modernity. The transition from the pre-modern (agro-literate) to the modern period (the industrial era) was an outcome of rapid economic progress. Industrial society, in order to sustain itself, depends on perpetual growth and this can be achieved by perennial shift in the occupational structure. The changing nature of work demanded cultural homogeneity and in order to achieve that state emphasized on the development of education which defined the status of the individual. Therefore a major populace of the society was politicized, which ultimately gave rise to the phenomenon of nationalism – which was largely an interest of elite or people of ‘high culture’. In the period of industrialization a ‘high culture pervades the whole society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity’. Hence history acts as a pivot around which the nationalist discourse is weaved; it is interpreted and remembered in a particular way so that “there is a uniform and unitary memory amongst the people of the nation”. This ‘unitary memory’ is indispensable for the formation of a ‘unitary consciousness’. Thus, time has a great significance which makes an important tool for nationalists for the promotion of nationalism. The memory of the past and aspirations for the future are entwined with a homogeneous ‘high culture’ which creates a concrete social bond within a population. As Tom Nairn writes:
“All cultures have been obsessed by the dead and placed them in another world. Nationalism re-houses them in this world. Through its agency the past ceases being ‘immemorial’: it gets memorialized into time present, and so acquires a future. For the first time it is meaningfully projected on to the screen of futurity”.
Thus, the dead are memorialized through monuments, cenotaphs and ‘tombs of Unknown soldiers’. National identity is cultivated through collective memory that helps in defining the national character and provides a main link to cultural pasts. For French, 1789 is the defining moment of their history, and thus it is a unitary ‘collective memory’; the memory of this selective past (French Revolution) makes it instant; therefore an identity is created which leads to the imagining of the nation. So we can say only after politics became an aspect of the larger society that nationalism was introduced, and this occurred with modernity. With the growth of capital industry there emerged a new middle class that became a predominant actor in the socio-political arena and consequently changed its nature.
Eventually, with politics becoming ‘non-elite, then a majority, concern’, these majorities could aspire for the common goals. This subjective transition in group imagination from considering themselves as community to a politically-aware and self-conscious society brought a structural change – the movement from ‘Gameinschaft’ (community) to ‘Gesellschaft’ (society). Gellner is of the view that it is in this ‘Gesellschaft’ (modernity) that nation-state and activities of nationalism were possible.
Primodalists on the other hand saw nation not simply a construct of modernity but as an entity that has formed through natural evolution from ethnic communities of the pre-modern period. The major advocates of this theory are Clifford Geertz, Walker Connor and John Hutchinson. According to these theorists culture is a ‘continuum transmitting ethnic groupings in history into the nations of modernity, and will continue in some form into the future’. Anthony D. Smith in his book The Ethnic Origins of Nations argues that the ‘unitary concept’ of a ‘natural nation’ is their ethnic make up. He identifies ‘three revolutions’ through which nationalism emerged. These are the transition from feudalism to capitalism; the ‘revolution in the control of administration’; and the cultural and educational revolution. The characteristics of nations and their nationalisms, however, exist in elements prior to these revolutions that are located in a group’s ethnie – embedded in the culture. Preserving the ethnie thus becomes an utmost importance if the goal of nation-state is approached via ethnicity. Germany during 1930’s and the Balkans in the last decade exhibited this extreme tendency by homogenizing culture with ethnicity, culminating into Holocaust in Germany or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Johann Gottlieb Fichte in his Addresses to the German Nation (1806) had accentuated this notion of the German nation-state quite emphatically:
“Thus was the German nation placed-sufficiently united within itself by a common language and a common way of thinking, and sharply enough severed from the other peoples-in the middle of Europe, as a wall to divide races not akin ….”

 


Published in Greater Kashmir (March 25, 2009) 

Kashmir Conflict and Academic Discourses

Recently I was reading a journal article “Federalism and the Indian Experience with Nation Building: An Appraisal” written by a Kashmiri academician Prof. Noor Ahmad Baba in South Asian Survey (2011). His central idea is that unity in a federal system can be achieved only through affective and political integration not through misconceived legal integration. Thus, he sees Kashmir Conflict as an outcome of problematic post-colonial over-centralizing Indian political system that infringed upon the autonomous ethno-regional status of Kashmiris. Well, does this analysis seem familiar to you? Yes, indeed it is. Because what Prof. Baba is driving at in his article is now a well-worn theme on Kashmir conflict and he is merely trying to sell old wine in a new bottle.
In fact, most of the academic works on Kashmir conflict somewhat carry the similar theme: denial of democracy to Kashmiris created the Kashmir conflict. For example, Sumit Ganguly (1996) would say Kashmir represents “both the mobilization success and, simultaneously, the institutional failure of Indian democracy” (pp. 76-107). His basic argument is like this: the armed militancy in Kashmir occurred because institutional structure of post-colonial India did not accommodate Kashmir’s political demands as they, with gradual modernization and increasing literacy, became politically more assertive. He is drawing from Samuel Huntington’s thesis that the absence of strong political institutions together with rapid economic growth far from contributing to democracy can lead to political instability. In other words modernization created new avenues of social and economic mobility and bolstered demands for political participation. When educated and politically conscious mass of people (thanks to growth of mass media also) emerged, gradually they began to seek their political rights. But as their political demands were not accommodated within an institutional framework it culminated in political violence in 1989.
Then we have Sumantra Bose (1997) arguing more or less in similar vein. His argument is that Kashmir’s strong urge for secession is a result of “…Indian states’ consistent policy of denying democracy” to the people of Kashmir (p. 19). The similar arguments come from other authors who lay blame at Indian states’ interventionist role in Kashmiri politics (dismissal of an elected Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah in 1985, his party National Conference’s Accord with Congress and rigged elections, especially in 1987) as responsible for giving birth to armed militancy in Kashmir in 1989 (Bhattacharjea, 1994; Hewitt, 1995).
Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay (1997), looks at economic dimension of the conflict, arguing that “shrinking career opportunities for the urban middle class combined with closed avenues for the expression of their political dissent” was the main motivating factors for secessionist movement. (p. 495).
All these are very fine points. But they hardly explain why would people get ready to die because they were not allowed to express their political aspirations through institutionalized medium? Why call to arms so suddenly resonated strongly across the people of Kashmir? And importantly, why would people demand “azadi” (independence) or merger with Pakistan when all the fight was about genuine elections?
Then, to address these questions, do we need to look beyond paradigms that dominate the academic discourse on Kashmir conflict? The answer is yes.
What we have been reading and hearing all along (mainly through the nexus of academia-media-political rhetoric) is state versions of India and Pakistan, referring to conspiracies and circumstances of partition, reducing the Kashmir conflict to a property dispute or blame games of who is responsible for militancy in Kashmir. Behind these dominant state-patronized themes Kashmir’s autonomous political agency gets blurred. It is this independent political agency of Kashmiri nation that is at stake and it is the responsibility of Kashmiri academics and scholars to present the Kashmir case from Kashmiri perspective, as and when it evolved from twentieth century through present dynamic times. What we need is radical break from the dominant discourses on Kashmir Conflict.
The denial-of-democracy and other arguments of above mentioned authors have come under serious academic scrutiny to the point of engendering a discursive break.
Let us take the Pakhtoon raid theory first. Australian scholar Christopher Snedden in his book Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013) busted the long discussed theory around the circumstances of Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession to India. Snedden through primary sources establishes that there were three main reasons for Jammu and Kashmir’s dispute. First, a Muslim Uprising in Poonch region started by ex-British India servicemen from that area against the Maharaja. Second, the large scale massacre of Jammu Muslims, especially targeting people of eastern Jammu. And finally, the formation of Azad Kashmir provisional government on 24 October 1947. This significant research on the beginnings of the Kashmir Conflict shedS light on important historical events that had remained obscured under dominant discourses. It busted the biggest myth that Pakhtoon raid on October 22, 1947 was the sole reason that forced Maharaja to accede to India.
Now let us come to the recent events in Kashmiri political history. The 1989 armed uprising has drawn attention of academics and media alike. But here too we see a dominant discourse being perpetuated to undermine the Kashmiri version of the most significant and determining political event. The 1989 armed uprising is attributed to failure of democracy in Kashmir. But this discourse is also countered by the major protagonists of the 1987.
For example, the Chief of Hizbul Mujhadeen, Syed Salahuddin in an interview with Greater Kashmir (published on April 14, 2008) somehow cleared the notion about 1987 elections (whose rigging is seen as a main reason for the start of armed militancy in Kashmir). I would quote his reply in full here:
“It is absolutely wrong that I picked up arms because the elections were rigged. Muftis are giving the election results a wrong twist. I was a freedom fighter long before I fought elections. I have inherited this from my forebears. My brother, Sayed Ghulam Muhammad, was the district president of Plebiscite Front in Budgam. My grandfather, Haji Ghulam Mohiuddin, was tortured by a very infamous police officer; his mouth stuffed with hot potatoes, kicked and beaten, because he used to observe Indian Independence Day as a ‘black day.’ We fought elections so that we could pass resolution in the assembly for freedom of Kashmir. India knew that. That is why they rigged the elections. People remember that when I was campaigning for the elections, I used to begin my speech with ay mard-e-mujahid jaag zara. Fighting elections were a means to educate masses about the freedom struggle. We wanted endorsement of public sentiment in the assembly. Otherwise who would have voted for my person, I was nobody. But people voted for the sentiment. Even the relatives of my opponent Ghulam Mohiuddin Shah voted for me. And those who were campaigning for elections became top resistance leaders. We were ideologically driven by the struggle for freedom.
There was a case against me in which the then SSP had said that I was not campaigning for elections but for freedom.”
If the Muslim United Front (MUF) had won the elections, we would have tabled a resolution for right of self-determination. India would have dissolved the assembly and that would have triggered the freedom struggle. Majority of the MUF members were in favour of such a resolution. The MUF was anti-India by its very nature and essence. We were going to use elections to get to the goal, but that didn’t mature.”
Similarly another protagonist of 1987 Abdul Aziz, popularly known as Genaral Mosa (presently the President of Tehreek-i-Kashmir) shared similar thoughts in an interview with Rising Kashmir in December 2013: “it was not just in 1989 that guns came here. They have come here since 1947. Youth did not go to Pakistan in 1989. Prior to that, outfits were working underground. There were Al-Fata and Student Federation operating. In 1965 and 1975, guns and grenades were recovered here. So those routes have never stopped and shall never close. Kashmir’s struggle for freedom was a process laden with phases and 1989 was one of the chapters.”
These two protagonists of 1989 emphasize on that fact that prior to 1987 elections there existed an active political movement (Plebiscite Front, Al Fatah etc) against Indian rule. The dominant discourse about 1989 armed uprising is either the denial-of-democracy or the Pakistan-sponsored “terrorism” or “proxy war” in Kashmir.
What is lost in these discourses is the subject of Kashmiri nationalism. In fact, there is hardly any systemic study done on the subject of Kashmiri nationalism so far, despite its political significance.
Although Sumantra Bose (1997) and Rekha Chowdhary Tremblay (1997) do talk about Kashmiri nationalism in their works but their treatment of this subject is informed by what John Cockell calls as “precast statist parameters of inquiry” (Cockell, 2000, p. 325) that reduces Kashmiri self-determination movement as a political mobilization responding to existing unaccommodating institutional channels. The problem with such line of inquiry is that it “effectively denies the Kashmiri community any autonomous political agency outside of that defined by these institutions” (ibid).
In his analysis of Kashmiri nationalist movement, John G. Cockell (2000) defines it as “subaltern insurgent consciousness…informed by the collective ethnic awareness of subjective community and autonomous political agency” (p. 340). His argument is that in post-colonial condition Kashmiris carved out a separate political space (Plebiscite Front, J&K Youth League, Muslim United Front, All Parties Hurriyat Conference) to replace the state-controlled institutions that denied their autonomous political agency (p. 332-33).
Cockell’s analysis of Kashmiri nationalism is a significant departure from Tremblay’s assessment. While Cockell recognizes “the autonomous origins and ideology” of the Kashmiri identity (p. 326), Trembley perceives it as a “construct” shaped in post-colonial “nation-building” process involving legal and constitutional apparatuses, like Article 370 and State Subject law that created a sense of separate identity among Kashmiris (p. 486-87). Trembley is reluctant to see Kashmiri self-determination movement as a genuine political expression of Kashmiri national identity outside of post-colonial institutional framework.
That is why Cockell’s analysis is significant as it is unconventional. But there lies a problem in his analysis too and that is he does not problematize the element of “Kashmiriyat” which forms an important part of his thesis. Chitralekha Zutshi (2003) in her historical study of the concept calls Kashmiriyat a “homogenizing discourse…a neat way to propagate the idea of a peaceful coexistence of religious communities while obscuring the question of economic, material and social differences between them.” (p. 329). However, despite this problem Cockell provides a fresh outlook and enhances our understanding of the Kashmir conflict as his insights mark a change in the dominant discourse that undermines Kashmir’s independent political agency.
Significantly, 2008 and 2010 civil uprisings changed the way Kashmir conflict was perceived. These two uprisings spawned numerous writings (Until My Freedom Has Come; Kashmir: A Case for Freedom; Of Occupation and Resistance etc.) but what is different about them is their treatment of the subject. These new writings employ subjective elements to present Kashmir as a conflict involving real humans living under hard circumstances and not merely a territorial dispute between the two nation-states armed with all kinds of weapons. These new writings are bold, informed, and assertive.
In summary, what we have so far as academic scholarship on Kashmir Conflict is ridden with bias and politics of selectivity. Of late, the new entries into the field have opened up ways to explore the conflict anew and counter the dominant discourses whipped up by a strong nexus of academia-media-political rhetoric. What we need is academic focus, informal coordination, personal commitments and collective imagination.

Published in Greater Kashmir (January 16, 2014)

http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jan/16/kashmir-conflict-and-academic-discourses-35.asp